Abstract. Much data access occurs via HTTP, which is becoming a universal transport protocol. Because of this, it has become a common exploit target and several HTTP specific IDSs have been proposed as a response. However, each IDS is developed and tested independently, and direct comparisons are difficult. We describe a framework for testing IDS algorithms, and apply it to several proposed anomaly detection algorithms, testing using identical data and test environment. The results show serious limitations in all approaches, and we make predictions about requirements for successful anomaly detection approaches used to protect web servers.
Introduction
The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) [14] has become a universal transport protocol. For example, it is used for file sharing [19] , payment processing [12] , remote procedure calls [29] , streaming media [1] , and even protocols such as SSH [40] . Custom web applications and the rush toward Web Services [3] mean that in the future, we can expect heavier use of HTTP. Robertson et al. [32] claimed that many web applications are written by people with little expertise in security and that web-based vulnerabilities represent 25% of the total security flaws reported in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures list (CVE) [5] 1999 through 2005.
The importance of HTTP and the security problems have led many researchers to propose intrusion detection systems (IDSs) for use with HTTP. Unfortunately, the proposed IDSs suffer from one or more of the following problems:
-The proposed IDS is not fully described and the source code is not available.
-The test data is not available, preventing a direct comparison.
-The test data is not labeled, preventing replication.
-The test data is not representative of traffic seen today.
To address this problem, we describe a framework for comparing IDS algorithms, and we use this framework to compare several anomaly IDS algorithms under identical circumstances. This framework 1 and the attack data 2 are open source to encourage further experimentation. Under more rigorous testing, not all algorithms perform as well as the initial tests showed, and we discuss why some algorithms do better than others.
Three basic architectures of IDSs exist: signature detection, specification, and anomaly detection. We focus in this paper on anomaly detection. Signature detection systems cannot detect novel attacks, while specification systems require skills well beyond those commonly used when developing web applications. Additionally, whenever the protected program changes, the specification must be updated. Although we test only anomaly IDSs, the framework can be applied to signature and specification based algorithms as well.
The organization of the paper is as follows. The following section, Section 2, sets the stage by describing previous IDS testing, with a focus on systems designed for HTTP. We then briefly describe the test framework and test data in Section 3. The specific algorithms we tested are described in Section 3.3, followed by the test results in Section 4. Our discussion of the results follows in Section 5, while Section 6 concludes the paper with a summary of our results and a discussion of future work.
Prior Work
There are at least two reasons to testing IDSs: (1) to verify that an algorithm is effective and efficient at detecting attacks, and (2) to compare two or more algorithms to determine the better under various metrics.
Most IDS testing is little more than asking, "Does the IDS detect one or a few attacks?" Better are researchers who ask the question, "Which of the following attacks can the IDS detect?" Even this testing is often acknowledged as weak.
Good testing is repeatable; the data are available to other researchers facilitating direct comparisons of the results, the training data are representative of real systems, and the attack data accurately represent the diversity of attacks. A good test also compares two or more valid approaches (i.e., no straw man arguments). The results of a good test should provide guidance about which system or algorithm performs best under different circumstances. To this point, most IDSs for web servers have been weakly tested, and/or the tests are limited in their scope. In their review of IDS testing, Athanasiades et al. state that they do not believe this problem will ever be properly solved [2] .
There are several explanations for the scarcity of good IDS testing. Identifying appropriate data is difficult-the data must be representative of realistic operating conditions. Data collected live from a network might be subject to
